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Abstract 
Prior research established that when ingroup leaders commit serious 
transgressions, such as breaking enforceable rules or engaging in bribery, 
people treat them leniently compared with similarly transgressive regular group 
members or outgroup leaders (‘transgression credit’). The present studies test a 
boundary condition of this phenomenon, specifically the hypothesis that 
transgression credit will be lost if a leader’s action implies racist motivation. In 
study 1, in a corporate scenario, a transgressive ingroup leader did or did not 
express racism. In study 2, in a sports scenario, an ingroup or outgroup leader or 
member transgressed rules with or without a racist connotation. Both studies 
showed that ingroup transgressive leaders lost their transgression credit if their 
transgression included a racial connotation. Wider implications for constraining 














A step too far? Leader racism inhibits transgression credit 
In contemporary societies, expressions of racism are perceived as a moral taboo 
(Fiske, 1998; Monin & Miller, 2001; see Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997). 
Individuals go to great lengths in order to avoid signaling racism (Crocker, Major, 
& Steele, 1998; Effron, Cameron, & Monin, 2009). When confronted with 
ambiguous choices involving race, individuals act in a way that affirms their moral 
standing (Merritt et al., 2012).  
At the intergroup level, the presence of racist ingroup members may tarnish the 
group’s reputation. Specifically, van Leeuwen, van den Bosch, Castano, and 
Hopman (2010) showed that when an outgroup failed to reject a member who 
had made racist comments, the group was perceived as more racist. Ingroup 
members’ expressions of racism are therefore likely to represent a threat to the 
group’s reputation because they break a taboo that most groups might wish to 
avoid (Dovidio, 2001). Consequently, it seems plausible that groups may wish to 
distance themselves from members who express racism.  
Consistent with this research, central members of political parties seem subject 
to harsh and swift reactions if they are suspected of racism, in spite (or because) 
of their role. For example, Don Yelton, a North Carolina GOP chair, was forced to 
resign following a racist comment during an interview. The Republican Party was 
quick to issue a statement claiming that ‘in no way are [Yelton’s] comments 
representative of the local or state Republican Party’. The same fate befell 
Godfrey Bloom, a member of the European Parliament representing the UK 
Independence Party, when he made pronouncements that were judged to be 
racist.  
The 2014 European Parliament elections revealed a notable shift in public 
support towards far right leaning political parties, such as the Front National in 
France and the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the UK. Despite the clear 
policy focus of Front National and UKIP on restricting or eliminating immigration 
and on prioritizing ‘true’ members of the country (defined in rather essentialist 
terms), leaders of both parties were careful during their campaigns to insist that 
they—and hence their party—were not racist. It seems plausible that this 
reflected the leader’s desire to demonstrate commitment to the group’s 
(potentially racist) ideology while at the same time ensuring s/he maintained 
credibility within the larger intergroup context by avoiding being labeled racist.  
On the other hand, examples of corrupt or immoral leader- ship abound 
(Kellerman, 2004; cf. Ludwig & Longenecker, 1993). Such leadership can have 
catastrophic consequences (e.g. the 2008 banking crisis). Nevertheless, 
individuals may tolerate questionable leaders (Shapiro, Boss, Salas, Tangirala, & 
Von Glinow, 2011) or their transgressions from general rules of conduct (Karelaia 
& Keck, 2013; Sutton & Jordan, 2013). Indeed, group leaders who deviate from 
norms may be tolerated more than deviant members. For example, new ingroup 
leaders who championed counter-normative attitudes were evaluated more 
favorably than comparable members—these leaders were granted ‘innovation 
credit’ (Abrams, Randsley de Moura, Marques, & Hutchinson, 2008). Moreover, 
recent research spanning different sport and business contexts, and different 
domains (e.g. team captains, leaders of ad hoc minimal groups, university 
chairs), showed that leaders who transgressed established rules or laws were 
evaluated less harshly than members who com- mitted the same transgressions 
(Abrams, Randsley de Moura, & Travaglino, 2013; Randsley de Moura & 
Abrams, 2013). Importantly, like innovation credit, this ‘transgression credit’ was 
only granted to ingroup leaders. Note that transgression is distinct from non-
conformity. Transgression involves contravention of formal rules, whereas non-
conformity may only involve divergence from salient norms (Abrams et al., 2013).  
According to subjective group dynamics theory (SGD; e.g. Marques, Abrams, 
Páez, & Hogg, 2001), people’s evaluations of group members reflect their 
motivation to sustain the subjective validity (including coherence and value) of 
the ingroup relative to the outgroup. Therefore, they endorse well-established 
(e.g. long serving) normative members (Pinto, Marques, Levine, & Abrams, 
2010), derogate ingroup deviants, and, under some circumstances, even praise 
outgroup deviants (e.g. Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000).  
When judging transgressive ingroup leaders, however, members face a dilemma. 
Given the centrality of a leader for defining the group image (Haslam, Reicher, & 
Platow, 2011; Hogg, 2001; Hogg, van Knippenberg, & Rast, 2012), members 
who withhold approval of a leader might risk seeming disloyal. Failing to support 
a leader might also disrupt the group’s functioning and hence disadvantage the 
group (van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, & Bobbio, 2008). Consistent with 
these ideas, a necessary condition for transgression credit is that members must 
not perceive the leader’s action to be motivated by concern for personal gain and 
self-interest (Abrams et al., 2013; study 5). Research has yet to demonstrate 
whether other variables can moderate transgression credit.  
In this paper, we depart from previous research by examining how individuals 
respond to leaders’ transgressions that have the potential to reflect negatively on 
the group and damage its social standing and reputation. Specifically, we 
propose that the transgression credit to leaders might be withheld if the leaders’ 
actions could be perceived as racist. Thus, we test an important boundary 
condition for transgression credit.  
Previous research has demonstrated that leaders (as distinct from members) 
appear to be granted transgression credit for immoral acts as long as these acts 
are clearly not self-interested. However, be- cause racism creates a moral taint 
that affects the group’s position not just vis-à-vis an outgroup but vis-à-vis society 
in general and because leaders are highly salient representatives of their groups, 
we expect that members will withhold transgression credit if the transgression is 
associated with racist sentiment.  
Overview and Pilot Studies 
Experiments 1 and 2 examined individuals’ evaluations of transgressive leaders 
in a business and sport scenario, respectively (for further details see Abrams et 
al., 2013; Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2013). We tested whether including a 
racist innuendo affected individuals’ evaluations of transgressive leaders.  
To test the effectiveness of the racism manipulation, we conducted two pilot 
studies (N=23 and N=25) with British non-psychology students recruited at the 
university library and café. In both pilot studies, participants were assigned 
randomly to conditions in a between-subject design (transgression: racism 
versus non-racism). Participants were asked whether a statement was racist and 
to what extent the speaker was being loyal to the group/team on a 7-point scale 
(1 = not at all to 7 = completely).  
In the first pilot, participants read a brief scenario asking them to imagine that 
some public organizations were competing for important funds to pay for a 
swimming pool. Participants were informed that there was a board meeting 
between the members of one of the organizations in order to discuss a proposal 
to be presented to a grant funding agency [called local enterprise partnership 
(LEP)]. Participants were also informed that the members of the organization 
were aware that the wife of one of the members shared the same art 
appreciation group as the LEP’s president.  
In the non-racism condition, participants read: “Ok, now a bit off the record 
please, I know it is against the rules, but I think what we should do is to send a 
convincing ‘gift’ to the president of the LEP panel. You know, just to help to make 
his mind up. To facilitate things. We all know that we have this connection 
between one of our members and the panel president. Why shouldn’t we take 
advantage of it?” In the racism condition, participants read an identical statement 
but with the following additional sentence: “After all, most of the members of the 
other organization are foreigners from who-knows-where. They’ve got plenty of 
swimming pools in their own countries”. As expected, the statement was 
perceived as more racist in the racism condition (M = 5.30, SD = 1.54), than in 
the non-racism condition (M = 1.80, SD = 1.03), t (21) = 6.17, p < .001. However, 
no differences were found concerning the perceived loyalty of the speaker (M = 
4.53, SD = .97, and M = 4.10, SD=1.20), t (21)=.97, p=.34.  
In a second pilot, participants were asked to imagine a competitive soccer game 
between two teams. They read that during the game, there was a clash between 
two players of two different nationalities. They were then informed that one of the 
players (the speaker) involved in the clash was quoted as saying: “You idiot, 
watch yourself and go to hell” (non-racism condition). In the racism condition, the 
(almost identical) statement was “You idiot, watch yourself and go the hell back 
to your country”. As expected, the statement was perceived as being more racist 
in the racism condition (M = 6.21, SD = 1.21), compared with the non-racism 
condition (M = 1.36, SD = 1.67), t (23) = 11.13, p < .001. However, perceptions of 
the speaker’s loyalty (M = 3.71, SD = 1.73, and M = 3.60, SD = 0.47) did not vary 
across conditions, t (23) = .18, ps = .86.  
In sum, those two pilot studies showed that individuals correctly distinguished 
between the racist and non-racist statements designed for use in the two 
experiments that follow. However, no differences were found between speakers’ 
perceived loyalty.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants and Design  
Fifty introductory psychology students participated as part of a course 
requirement and were assigned randomly to judge a leader who transgressed 
either with or without racist sentiment.  
Procedure and Materials  
Based on a similar paradigm in previous research (Randsley de Moura & 
Abrams, 2013), using the Qualtrics online platform, participants read about an 
interuniversity competition for a  ‘LEP’ government investment that could 
ultimately generate substantial revenues and important services for students and 
faculty, specifically a (highly desired) university swimming pool. After a tough 
selection procedure, their university (Kent) and a similarly ranked outgroup 
university [Royal Holloway University of London (RHUL)] had been shortlisted. 
Representatives from both universities were about to have a series of meetings 
with the LEP. The LEP’s chief executive had recently been profiled in the 
Business Section of The Times Newspaper, reporting that the chief executive 
had a designer house containing an impressive collection of modern art and that 
the chief executive’s wife and the spouse of a member of Kent’s senate 
happened to share the same art appreciation group.  
Participants were then told that they would be reading some (anonymized) 
relevant transcriptions from an informal pre- meeting discussion conducted by 
the members of the ingroup delegation. They were asked to select any two of 
four people (named A, B, C, D) so that they could be shown randomly selected 
statements from an individual from the beginning, middle, and end of the 
discussion. These statements were generally simply positive suggestions about 
how to be persuasive. In fact, all participants were informed that they had 
selected the leader of the delegation. Embedded among the leader’s statements 
was the manipulation of transgression. According to condition, participants read 
the statements from pilot 1, specifying the ingroup and outgroup university, and 
referring to ‘students’ rather than members. The statement either included or did 
not include a racist component.  
Participants used a _50 to +50 slider scale to indicate how they felt towards the 
leader and used a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disapprove, 7 = strongly approve) 
to show how much they approved of the leader.  
Results and Discussion 
Both feelings (M = -11.46, SD = 22.49)  and approval (M = 3.04, SD = 1.35)  
towards the leader were below the scale midpoints (t (49) = 18.92, 5.01, 
respectively, ps < .001), indicating negative evaluations. Because the two 
measures were highly correlated (r =.80), we standardized both scores and 
computed a mean. Evaluations of the transgressive leader were significantly 
harsher in the racism condition than in the non-racism condition, D = .60, SE = 
.27, t (48) = 2.18, p = .034. This is consistent with our hypothesis that, other 
things being equal, a transgressive ingroup leader is evaluated less positively if 
the transgression involves a racist component.  
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 provided a first test of our hypotheses in a corporate scenario. 
Experiment 2 extended the test, contrasting a transgression that either included 
or did not include a racist sentiment in a sport scenario. Experiment 2 also 
presents a full test of transgression credit by including evaluations of other 
relevant targets including outgroup targets. Transgression credit occurs if the 
transgressive ingroup leader is judged more favorably than a similar outgroup 
leader and transgressive members from either group (Abrams et al., 2013). We 
predict that transgression credit will arise in the non-racism condition but not in 
the racism condition.  
The sports context is well suited for testing our hypotheses because it provides a 
simplified (yet reliable) context for the investigation of larger organizational 
processes, both in terms of structural similitude and of sociopsychological 
mechanisms implied (Day, Gordon, & Fink, 2012). We adapted a paradigm from 
Abrams et al. (2013) in which a soccer captain (versus player) in a team 
transgresses the rules of the game by hurling abuse at an opposing player.  
Method 
Participants and Design  
Members of sports teams at University of Kent sports clubs were invited to 
participate in a study of perceptions of sports situations (N = 120, 92 male, Mage 
= 30.2 years), all of whom expressed an interest in soccer. Analyses revealed no 
effects of age or gender, so these were not considered further. Participants were 
assigned randomly to conditions in a mixed- model factorial design 2 (team: in-
group versus out-group) × 2 (transgressor: captain versus player) × (type: non-
racism versus racism) × (target: normative, transgressive). Target was a within-
participants factor.  
Procedure and Materials  
Participants identified the soccer team they supported and named their team’s 
main rival, as in Abrams et al. (2013). This method ensures salience of the 
intergroup competition and samples across multiple ingroup–outgroup pairs, 
thereby widening the generalizability of the evidence.  
Participants thought of the captain and a player from their soccer team or their 
main rival team, then read a scenario involving a crucial game against the rival 
team where winning was essential. Either the ingroup (or the outgroup) captain 
(or player) clashed with an opposing player and then ‘advanced aggressively 
against the opposing player and, while the referee was distant, shouted at the 
opposing player’.  
In the non-racism condition, the transgressor shouted: “you idiot, watch yourself 
and go to hell”. In the racism condition, this was modified to, “You idiot, watch 
yourself and go the hell back to your country”. Participants then read that when 
the referee came into earshot, the transgressor stopped the abusive language. 
The story concluded by stating that while the other target disagrees with what he 
saw, he did not say any- thing and continued to play normally. Finally, the 
transgressor was described as refusing to engage in the customary handshake 
with opposing team players at the end of the game.  
Participants completed the evaluation measure from Abrams et al. (2013). They 
were asked to rate (from 1 = not at all, 7 = completely) the extent to which each 
target was likeable, friendly, warm, approachable, and nice (αs > .92). The 
questionnaire included additional non-evaluative measures as part of a wider 
validation study and which are beyond the scope of the present paper.  
Results and Discussion 
Across participants, 31 different teams were supported, and 29 different main 
rivals were nominated, all from the same country. A group (ingroup versus 
outgroup) × transgressor (captain versus player)×type (non-racism versus 
racism) × target (transgressive, normative) ANOVA was performed with repeated 
measures on the target factor (Table 1).  
There were significant main effects of Group, F (1, 112) = 52.85, p<.001, η2=.27; 
transgressor, F (1, 112)=7.39, p=.008, η2 =.04; and type, F (1, 112)=11.13, 
p<.001, η2 =.05. Ingroup targets were judged more favorably (M = 3.65, SE = 
.088) than outgroup targets (M = 2.74, SE = .088), p < .001). Targets were 
judged more favorably when transgressors were captains (M = 3.36, SE = .088) 
rather than players (M = 3.02, SE = .088), p = .004. Targets were judged more 
favorably when there was a non-racial transgression (M=3.40, SE=.088) than 
when there was a racial one (M = 2.99, SE = .088), p < .001.  
Target interacted significantly with transgressor, F (1, 112) = 107.80, p < .001, η2 
= .39, and with type, F (1, 112) = 17.59, p < .001, η2 = .07. There were significant 
three-way interactions for target × group × type, F (1, 112) = 9.47, p = .003, η2 = 
.03, and target × transgressor × type, F (1, 112) = 22.43, p < .001, η2 = .08 and 
group × transgressor × type, F (1, 112) = 7.24, p = .008, η2 = .04. All these were 
qualified by a target × group × transgressor × type interaction, F (1, 112) = 5.20, 
p = .024, η2 = .02. Consistent with the predicted differences in transgression 
credit, the simple group × transgressor × target interaction was significant in the 
non-racism condition, F (1, 112) = 5.09, p = .03, η2 = .01 but not in the racism 
condition, F (1, 112) = 3.27, p = .07, η2 = .01. Note that these two interactions 
differ in form. In the non-racism condition, a transgressive ingroup captain was 
favored more than a transgressive player. In the racism condition, the 
transgressive ingroup captain was favored less than an ingroup transgressive 
player. Moreover, the simple group × type × target interaction was significant in 
the captain condition, F (1, 112) = 14.36, p < .001, η2 = .05 but not in the player 
condition, F (1, 112) = .32, p = .57, η2 = .001 (Figure 1). In the player condition, 
all transgressive players were judged less favorably than normative players. In 
the captain condition, all transgressors except the non-racist ingroup captain 
were judged less favorably than normative captains.  
Our focal prediction was that the non-racist ingroup captain would be evaluated 
more favorably than other transgressors. As predicted, the pairwise difference 
between evaluations of the non-racist and racist transgressor was significant only 
when the transgressor was the ingroup captain (F (1, 112) = 57.33, p < .001, η2 
= .28. All other transgressive targets received unfavorable evaluations whether or 
not the transgression involved racism (largest F = 2.93, p > .09).  
General Discussion 
Previous research showed that transgression credit is given to an ingroup team 
captain who breaks the rules of the game and to an organizational leader who 
proposes serious illegal acts such as bribery or blackmail (Abrams et al., 2013; 
Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2013). However, we have now shown an 
important qualification of the transgression credit effect. If ingroup leaders 
express racist sentiment, they contravene a salient moral taboo that may bring 
the whole group into societal disrepute, and consequently, they no longer benefit 
from transgression credit.  
Experiment 1 showed that such a leader receives significantly less favorable 
responses if the transgression is accompanied by racist sentiment. Notably, in 
both the racist and non- racist condition, the leader was seeking to gain an 
advantage over an outgroup, but it seems that an implication of racist motive is 
sufficient to quell favorability towards the leader.  
Experiment 2 used a different paradigm, context and type of participants to test 
whether transgression credit would be denied to a racist ingroup leader. 
Consistent with findings by Abrams et al. (2013), an ingroup soccer captain who 
transgressed the rules of the game was evaluated more favorably than either an 
ingroup player or outgroup captains or players who acted similarly. However, 
when the ingroup captain also expressed racist sentiment, the transgression 
credit disappeared. In fact, this maps to a real world example. The captain of 
Chelsea soccer team, John Terry, was fined and banned for four games after 
making racist remarks to an opposing player. To demonstrate the validity of his 
repentance, Terry was required to wear an anti-racist armband in order to retain 
the captaincy of the team.  
Might it be that, beyond being non-racist, leaders are not expected to derogate 
outgroups? This possibility could be addressed in future research, along with the 
broader question of whether leaders are expected to avoid all forms of prejudice. 
However, we note that ingroup leaders may sometimes be condoned rather than 
criticized for negative treatment of out- groups (Platow, Hoar, Reid, Harley, & 
Morrison, 1997). Moreover, the racism expressed in the present studies was not 
directed at the outgroup category as a whole. Indeed, in both studies the ingroup 
and outgroup shared the same nationality. Therefore, when both transgression 
and racism are clearly non-normative (as evidenced by responses to all 
transgressive members), the distinctive feature that eliminated transgression 
credit to the ingroup leader was whether that leader expressed racist sentiment 
during the transgression.  
These findings are consistent with the idea that people use multiple criteria for 
judging the acceptability of transgressions (Haidt et al., 1997), and we have 
shown that leadership is a special case. Our evidence shows that group 
members’ responses to others’ transgressions depend not only on the 
transgression itself but also on the role and the group membership of the 
transgressor and the implications for the group’s image. These findings on 
reactions to racism have particular relevance for the strategies used by leaders 
that aim to promote xenophobic beliefs and attitudes. The wider implication is 
that invoking standards for judgment that are societal (such as the racism taboo), 
rather than group-specific (such as group-serving motivation), can be a vehicle 
for constraining transgressive leadership.  
As well as complementing and extending previous research on the prejudice 
taboo to address the way it affects evaluations of leadership, these studies also 
established that expressing counter-normative racism sets a boundary condition 
for transgression credit to ingroup leaders. We are, however, conscious that 
some groups actively and explicitly promote racism, and so, an important future 
research question is how they, and their leaders, manage to sustain their own 
value even if they are aware that such views are likely to attract highly negative 
societal reactions.  
Given the present findings, it is interesting to consider whether and how a racist 
subgroup or extremist faction that wishes to actively promote racism or 
xenophobia may try to insulate itself against external criticism. It is notable that 
even leaders of far right political parties may choose to tread carefully—perhaps 
aiming to benefit either from ‘innovation credit’ or even some transgression credit 
(e.g. flouting procedural  
and other rules) from their ingroup but yet carefully rejecting any accusations that 
they are ‘racist’ (see Verkuyten, 2013). Clearly, however, there do exist political 
and other groupings that are explicitly racist. Therefore, if society is to find ways 
to challenge such groups, an important line of inquiry is to investigate how they 
sustain such positions in the context of external pressure.  
A further question is how extreme a leader’s expression of prejudice has to be to 
precipitate efforts to depose the leader. In the present study, the racist 
expressions were fairly mild, but we might assume that a more blatant and direct 
form of racial abuse or racist attitude may be enough to force a leader’s 
resignation because a leader, being a unique and central group member, cannot 
readily be reformed. It may be that the thresh- olds for removing racist members 
would be higher because they can more easily be ‘resocialised’ to conform to 
more acceptable limits (Levine & Moreland, 1994). Compared with leaders, 
members are also more readily substitutable, and therefore, an individual 
member who expresses racism may pose less of a threat to the group’s 
credibility.  
Finally, although we have identified one important boundary condition for 
transgression credit, further research is clearly needed to test other potential 
moderators of the effect. These might include other actions that elicit disgust or 
moral outrage, other factors affecting the reputation of the group, the degree of 
potential threat to the group such as its relative status (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), its 
size relative to other groups (cf. Mullen, 1991); the degree of conflict with other 
groups (Sherif, 1966); and factors relating to the particular characteristics of the 
leader and members (Levine & Moreland, 1994), or leader member exchange 
(Shapiro et al., 2011).  
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